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New Republic

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Outlook for 1951

CAN WE AVERT WORLD WAR?

AN EDITORIAL

TRUMAN'S STATE OF MIND

By RICHARD L. STROUT

HAROLD L. ICKES ON:

MacARTHUR vs PEARSON

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Coming January 15

STATE of the UNION

The THIRD ANNUAL *New Republic*
supplement on the Liberal Program

As the New Year approaches, America takes stock of her past and prepares for the grim necessities of 1951. A new Congress will assemble and the President will address that Congress on the State of the Union.

For the third successive year the *New Republic* will issue a special supplement, paralleling the President's traditional message and defining liberal tasks and liberal goals.

This year the emphasis will be upon our degree of readiness to meet the world crisis, reviewing the US-UN position and contrasting the years 1950 and 1941, which were profoundly different but also disturbingly alike.

The targets for 1951 will be set and an answer attempted to the question: How much growth will be required in the economy and how is it to be brought about?

Uncensored Report from COMMUNIST CHINA

The *New Republic* will shortly begin publication of an important series of articles reporting on conditions inside Communist China today.

Written by a European who very recently came out and whose identity may not be revealed, the series will answer such questions as these:

What is happening to the Chinese peasants who make up the overwhelming majority of the population? To small and middle-sized business? Why is the new Peoples Government protecting most capitalist enterprises for the immediate present? What is happening to the schools, foreign universities, the churches, the press? How are the Chinese Communists finding officials to run the big cities? Who are the people that put advertisements in newspapers pleading guilty to deviations from the party line?

Don't miss this informative series, soon to appear

The NEW REPUBLIC . 40 East 49 . New York 17

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WASHINGTON WIRE

WELL, WE shall give up Adam hats. McCarthy denounces Drew Pearson; radio sponsor Adam drops Pearson; we boycott Adam. It's a funny system. Politics are intruding in the queerest places! After a peculiarly sickening broadcast by Henry J. Taylor, sponsored by General Motors, declaring UK fiscal troubles were all due to the fact that the socialist British "wouldn't work," we bought a Plymouth instead of a Chevrolet [and think we got a better car at that]. But in what other age would you award patronage in the hat or carriage trade on the basis of politics?

Here is a thorny problem that cuts both ways! We regard Fulton Lewis as simply an adjunct of the GOP and know of repeated successful liberal boycotts directed against his local sponsorship. We have been told that Lewis' views are so dear to the heart of conservative business that Chambers of Commerce sound the tocsin when sponsorship lapses and see to it that a new local advertiser comes forward. If you protest to General Motors about their man Taylor, they respond indignantly that they are "not responsible" for his views which means that the DuPonts eat their cake and have it too.

But how about "freedom of the press" in all this? The difficulty is that we have a one-party press in a two-party political system. On the radio, particularly, the conservatives have all the cash. Drew Pearson is reasonably liberal so he gets a stab from McCarthy's poisoned hypodermic and the timid sponsor wilts at once. All advantage is with McCarthy because Congressional immunity protects him in character assassination. In the past, Congressmen feared the electors. But we must all fear our Congressmen these days because they can ruin any one of us under complete constitutional protection.

So far as we know the USA is the only big country that turns the nation's most essential natural resource, the citizens' minds, wholly over to hucksters on the air. Radio channels are not like newspapers—the analogy is false; they are educational assets like schools and should not be recklessly bought and sold in commercial interest. Other nations exercise direct responsibility. Canada has a government network. Britain has a stodgy but honest corporation, the BBC, which can thumb its nose at the government if it wants. We met a famous Cambridge University woman sociologist the other day, an authority on child welfare, and were impressed by the fact that she is one of BBC's directors. Is a sound and steady public opinion in time of national travail more apt to develop under such auspices, we ask, or under the big money hucksters who now alone decide what America shall hear?

Here is the best official post-Korean foreign policy appraisal we have been able to get. Russia has warned us not to rearm Germany; we are going ahead to rearm Germany, it may mean war—we shall risk it. We originally reckoned four years leeway to rearm, after Korea set two years to achieve a defense minimum, after Chinese intervention telescoped it all down a second time. That's why Washington is rattling along so incoherently now. Present objective: rearm as fast as possible by means short of all-out mobilization. What will Moscow do? So long as Russia hopes to get its goals by that route it is less likely to attack. It will push satellite wars, and wait to see if Hoover defeatism, GOP fanaticism and McCarthy blackguardism will do its work. Korea has shown a Soviet willingness to risk war beyond anything yet displayed; one reason State Department planners say is that Moscow thinks it could win a world war. An important deterrent may be the Kremlin's dread of its own people and armies. This appears not to be wholly wishful

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thinking but a careful appraisal of Russian conditions under grueling, protracted Soviet regimentation. All our joy planners agree on the necessity of keeping Western Europe's coal-steel complex out of Russian hands. Yet, in effect, Hoover would toss this into Moscow's lap while America pulled its two oceans over its head.

The House has passed a deceptive GI insurance bill which gyps the soldiers. It is written in the interest of the big private insurance companies. It is really a casualty indemnity policy. This is good in itself but is not "life insurance" such as World War I and II veterans got. Those veterans had the right to keep their insurance after demobilization at reasonable rates if they chose. Under the new bill there is no such option; the so-called "insurance" expires 90 days after the soldier is mustered out and he must buy a new policy from private companies. This is gross injustice.

One big reform the outgoing 81st Congress enacted was to curb the powers of the autocratic House Rules Committee. It empowered the chairman of any legislative committee to report a bill direct to the House if the Rules Committee failed to act after 21 days. Previously the committee bottled up bills subject only to a cumbersome majority petition discharge rule. Now GOP House Leader Joe Martin and Dixiecrat Eugene Cox (D, Ga.) are out to kill this reform. House procedural rules are adopted on the very first day of the session. This is one of the biggest decisions the House will take in its two-year life.

Notes: Some Republicans now feel they went too far in voting no-confidence in Acheson on the eve of Brussels; incidentally Truman might have let him go before, won't under any conditions now. . . . So-called voluntary price freeze is no freeze at all, merely stop-gap while controls are organized. . . . Watered-down tax bill will pay only about one-fifth of new defense spending. . . . And so, happy mid-century!

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Intervention Protest

SIR: I have yet to read in the *NR* a moral justification of our intervention (carpet bombing of civilians, flame throwers, evacuation of villages, friend and foe) in Korea—a people excluded from citizenship in our own country.

Is the *NR* policy now "my country, right or wrong?"

Did the *NR* back our intervention in Nicaragua (years ago), did it approve Russia's war against Finland in 1940 (just to see how it looks, looking at another country)?

Why is there not one liberal magazine that is willing to let some one speak against intervention. Surely there is some competent person you wouldn't call a Communist who is against what I would call the US's most terrible blunder in all its history.

San Francisco, Calif. NED LEWIS

Canton Revisited

SIR: After reading Mr. Straight's article on Hongkong, I am sure that your readers will be interested in the visit of an old Hongkong resident to nearby Canton in Communist China.

"Compared to what it was pre-liberation, Canton surprised me by its cleanliness and orderliness. Such a state of affairs had never existed before, except and during the time of Wedemeyer's visit in 1948. The streets are clean, traffic is orderly and the supply of electricity is very much improved. The old rickshaws have been done away with and in their stead are pedi-cabs (two-seater vehicles pedalled by a cyclist) which are much cleaner. The drivers too are far cleaner than the rickshaw pullers. Beggars have practically disappeared. Furthermore, people in the streets are compelled to be vaccinated and innoculated—an action entirely new to the city.

"The income of the people is practically zero and their two aims in life seem to be the procurement of adequate food and clothing. All foreign films have been banned, and night life has practically disappeared except for one or two dance halls which are licensed. Life is very drab and colorless and the people have become defeatists. However, although they are busy from morning till night they have to find time for indoctrination courses and in the meanwhile they are all hoping for a better government and a better future.

"The Cantonese themselves do not like their Northern brothers and this dislike is plainly visible; but I must admit that they are extremely courteous with all whom they meet be they foreigners or non-foreigners.

"There is absolutely no Russian propaganda in Canton and there are only two monthly magazines on the stands in that language. However, in the book stores Chinese translations are plentiful and prices of these are extremely cheap. Prevalent propaganda and military discipline can almost be compared to that of the Japanese system with a Russian flavor."

Hongkong KAREL WEISS

Deferring Gifted Students

SIR: It strikes me that the advisory group to the Selective Service Board is making a touchy suggestion when it recommends a plan whereby students with unusually high IQ's and with outstanding academic records would be deferred from military service. I understand the necessity for developing the potentialities of the best brains in the country (I can also appreciate the grim analogy with the foresighted farmer who sets his best corn aside for seed), but I can foresee a serious morale problem if the current inductees get the idea that boys they have always regarded as grinds and sissies are to be spared the slogging and dangerous business of defending the country.

For the past several generations America has shown a disturbing anti-intellectual bias, and any provision that favors a man because of his superior intelligence or his scholarly industry is calculated to deepen this prejudice. It would seem to me a wiser course to draft the potential engineers, chemists, physicists, etc., on the same bases as everyone else and then have them assigned, by the Army, to such special studies as their abilities warrant. Soldiers will tolerate, however reluctantly, the notion that some of their number get the "breaks"; they will scarcely accept the suggestion that any group in the country is to be especially cherished by the draft board.

New York City ROBERT LITTLE

Material Wanted

SIR: Material is now being collected for a biography of my father, the late E. D. Morel, M. P., and his work for Congo Reform, for the Union of Democratic Control and for the labor movement. If anyone has pertinent letters or papers, we should be very grateful for a chance to copy and return them.

R. C. MOREL

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New Republic

CAN WE SAVE WORLD PEACE?

PEACE, the Communist and the China lobby notwithstanding, is clinging with a desperate grip to this stricken world as it turns into the New Year. How long can peace hold on? Never, as far as we know, have nations been torn apart of such conflicts, and then resolved them without war.

War now is certainly not in the national interest of the United States. Three-fifths of our military forces are engaged in Korea. The opening stages of a world war would be so catastrophic as to make ultimate victory improbable. Yet 1950 has demonstrated that when our Asian policy is the creature of domestic political pressures, it is by no means clear that the US will act in accordance with its national interest.

War now is certainly not in the national interest of the Chinese Communists. For that reason they have maintained the fiction that in Korea, China and the UN are not at war. Yet all present pressures are toward open warfare. The strength of the Communists turns on their leadership of Chinese nationalism. The US has ridden roughshod over legitimate national aspirations of China although we lack the strength to prevent Chinese retaliation. The result of our rigidity and our weakness Chinese nationalism and Soviet prodding may well be a Chinese declaration of war.

War now is probably not in the interest of Stalin. He has gained a great deal without war. He stands to gain more. Yet if he decides that war with the US is inevitable, 1951 may seem as good a time as any to attack. Europe is demoralized. The US is divided. In conventional armaments and existing armed forces the disparity between the strength of the Communist world and the weakness of the free nations is probably at its peak. In atomic weapons, although the relative superiority of our stockpile is diminishing, our absolute ability to devastate Russia continues to rise and our rate of production continues to be greater than hers.

As long as no more than one-twentieth of our production was directed to rearmament it did not matter to Stalin that our industrial capacity was four times that of the USSR. But now that a fifth of our capacity is allotted to rearmament Stalin may give serious consideration to so drastic and desperate a gamble as seizure of the Ruhr.

A further reason for Stalin to undertake this gamble is the imminence of German rearmament. It offers a long-range threat, justifying war for Stalin. And it offers a short-range opportunity. For if preventive action by Russia to forestall German rearmament should lead to war it would be a war which would offer Stalin the widest possible basis of support within Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the widest appeal to Western Europe and to the guilty conscience of Britain and the United States.

In addition, if Soviet action against the Ruhr should lead to war, the Red armies could reach the Channel without losing time or causing heavy casualties. Then Stalin from his unassailable position could appeal to the narrow self-interest of the US and offer a 20-year peace. Recently Otto Grotewohl, Stalin's German puppet, took pains to praise the Nazi-Soviet pact, obviously implying that if Stalin could reach an agreement with Hitler to carve up the world, he could do the same with Truman. The President might refuse, but his opposition who saw nothing alarming in Hitler's conquest of Europe would clearly grab at the bait. Stalin, after raising the ante, as he did with Hitler, and sweeping over Asia, would move on until the Stalinist caucus in the Tribune tower would bring out in triumph the first Communist edition of the Chicago *Tribune*.

We face great decisions in 1951, and quite properly, we are entering into the early stages of a great debate. The debate has been opened by Herbert Hoover. Our troops, he asserts, cannot defeat Russian troops on land. That is true. "The prime obligation of defense of Western Europe," he adds, "rests upon the nations of Europe. . . . America cannot create their spiritual forces. . . . We cannot buy them with money." That is also true.

It is true as Hoover asserts that our commitments have outrun our power in the effort to halt Communism on all fronts. It is true as Hoover adds that present policies of increasing our armaments and our commitments cannot restore the strategic balance that is necessary. Hoover's analysis is largely sound. It is his prescription that is wrong.

Hoover, the conservative, is appalled by the costs of mobilization. His program is to hold our rearmament effort in check, and to greatly reduce our commitments

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even at the cost of dishonoring our pledges under the North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter.

Hoover proposes to force the UN into an anti-Soviet mold, or to abandon it, which means to abandon the UN. He proposes to give no more aid to Europe unless Europe undertakes all its own defenses which means to abandon Europe. His argument in effect is that we and Russia should undertake a *de facto* division of the world in which Western Europe is ceded to Stalin. This division would be followed by years of accommodation during which we will "arm to the teeth" and wait patiently until "the evils of Communism bring about their own disintegration."

The trouble with this argument is that it parallels exactly the reasoning analyzed above which may lead Stalin to attack Western Europe in 1951. Just as our strategic abandonment of Korea led to the Korean War, so our strategic abandonment of Europe will lead at once to a world war.

Americans understand this. The real trouble is that present administration policies offer no sound answer to Hoover's half-spoken criticism. The Administration concedes that our commitments have outrun our power. It is moving half-heartedly to add to our power, and at the same time it is increasing our commitments. It is accepting additional responsibility for the defense of Europe, by placing Europe under a US Commander, without requiring Europeans to take the measures that can lead to adequate defense forces. Far worse, it is allowing another wing of the Republican Party (which as usual is working both sides of the street) to force us into greater and greater commitments in Asia, by unilateral action against China which our allies and the UN bitterly oppose.

The answer we suggest is neither the Administration's policy nor Hoover's. It is to add to our power by full-scale mobilization; to spread the responsibility for resisting aggression by political action; to concentrate our reserves according to strategic priorities; to reduce the basis of support for Communist expansion by striking out boldly for economic and social progress; to avoid unnecessary provocation; and to attempt broad negotiations.

Full mobilization is more than a matter of appropriating billions and watching them evaporate in inflation. Tight controls, universal service and a good tax bill now are worth ten divisions. International procurement and allocation of capacity are vital if our mobilization program is not to wreck those of our allies by world-wide inflation.

Spreading the responsibility means integration in the West and full support of the UN.

We have carried the main burden for the UN in Korea. We are bitter because others have failed to pay more than lip service to the common cause. The answer is not to abandon the UN but to realize that the apathy of other nations follows partly from their dislike of our unilateral Asian policy, and to modify our policy in Asia in recognition that we are part of a UN team.

The UN is not designed to wage cold war or to co-ordinate the strategy of the peace-loving nations. No other political body exists to carry out these functions. We are bitter at Europe's backbiting attitude. Europeans are bitter at being dragged behind US strategy without the opportunity to debate and change it. A common political council and the strengthening of Europe by federation are ways to spread the responsibility that we cannot carry alone.

Reaffirming our priorities means recognizing as we did in 1942 that the defense of Europe comes first. It means doubling our Air Force in England and increasing our divisions in Europe, even if they have to complete training there. It means reaching a peace settlement with China. The Chinese terms are evacuation of foreign troops from Korea, transfer of Formosa, and entry into the UN. On those terms we must negotiate. We should insist on UN supervised elections in Korea. We should cede to China's claim to membership in the UN which is a universal organization and not an alliance of like-minded nations. Pending UN discussions on Formosa, which the Chinese may accept, we should withdraw recognition from Chiang Kai-shek as the ruler of China which he obviously is not, and recognize him as the *de facto* ruler of Formosa which he obviously is. We should pull out the Seventh Fleet.

Backing economic and social progress means adopting land reform as US policy abroad. In feudal societies only the declaration that democracy means that the peasant owns the land can turn the tide against Communism. Where governments are moving against feudalism, as in India, economic aid is a vital means of conserving our manpower, since it means that the large armed forces of these countries can be freed for defense.

Avoiding provocation means holding back German rearmament until the Schuman Plan is completed, the Yugoslav armies are equipped, a European army is underway, and major effort has been made to meet with Russia to discuss the limitation and control of all weapons of war.

Limited negotiation based on Potsdam is undesirable since four-power control of a unified Germany would heighten present tensions. But rearmament is no alternative to broad negotiations for peace. We doubt if they can succeed. But no Western government can give up trying.

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THE WEEK

THE ASSEMBLY GOES HOME

LAKE SUCCESS (NR correspondent)

The United Nations assembly last week wound up most of its work. The exception was the operations of the political committee, which remained in a state of suspended animation, waiting to see what progress, if any, could be made by its special committee trying to arrange a cease-fire in Korea. The Chinese-Communist delegation had gone home, as truculent and intransigent as it came. On Friday, the Peiping radio broke the bad news. The Communists rejected unconditionally the United Nations bid for a cease-fire. They did so on the ground that since they are not represented, everything the United Nations does is illegal.

The overriding problem of the war in Korea continued to blanket everything else at Lake Success. The panic mood of a fortnight earlier was somewhat lessened as the military situation, while still black enough, seemed faintly better. It was understood that the chance appeared brighter that we could hold some sort of line, somewhere on the Korean peninsula, at least long enough to influence political discussions. Whether doing so would be worth its cost or indeed would have any effect on any possible political discussions seemed less than ever likely in view of the rejection of the cease-fire proposal.

With the slight lessening of the military tension, the tendency of UN delegates to criticize the United States, off the record of course, has increased. We have wholehearted support in our general policy only from Greece, Turkey and some of the Latin American countries even though the other non-Communist nations are not likely to vote against us on any serious issue. The major problem is whether we should discuss with Communist China anything other than the fighting in Korea, and whether we should continue to refuse even to consider Peiping membership in the UN.

Many of these other nations have always thought that Communist China was entitled to a seat, under any sound interpretation of the doctrine of recognition; indeed, the United States appears to be the only important country in the world which tries to decide these matters on a unilateral basis of like and dislike, morality and immorality. The other countries certainly do not want to "reward" aggression. They are, on the whole, just as anti-Communist as we are. Aside from the difference in attitude on international law just mentioned, they disagree with us primarily perhaps because they have a keener sense than we have of the physical realities of world power.

From the point of view of some of these countries, we Americans seem to exaggerate our own resources. We tend to promise more than we can deliver—as for example in the Truman doctrine. We sometimes tell other people to be brave under circumstances that are far more dangerous to them than those affecting us. We assure them we shall come to their aid, when they are grimly conscious that it is unlikely we can deliver the aid in the amount, and with the speed, that are implicitly promised.

In some quarters, to be sure, this feeling about the United States produces defeatism; but this is certainly not the view of the UN majority. That view is still that the United States is the leader of the democratic forces of the world; that we are learning fast; and that, in Ben Franklin's phrase, we must hang together or we shall all hang separately.

AEC AND PUBLIC POWER

At a time when the Atomic Energy Commission most needs the co-operation of Congress, the AEC has managed to alienate a House subcommittee on appropriations and rebuff public power all in two weeks time. Early this month the AEC laid before Congress plans to build a huge plant in Paducah, Kentucky, for production of U-235, requiring more than the normal supply of power available. At first the AEC proposed to obtain half the power from the Tennessee Valley Authority and half from the large private utility, American Gas and Electric Company. However, the AGE found that the project would be uneconomic, and, so as not to lose time, the AEC contracted with the TVA to put the whole power plant in its budget. This plan was approved by the Bureau of the Budget, the President, and the House appropriations subcommittee.

Five days later, without notifying either the TVA or the House committee, the AEC handed half the contract to a newly-formed organization, Electric Energy, Inc., composed of five smaller private power companies. In subsequent hearings before the subcommittee, it was brought out that the AEC Commissioner, Thomas E. Murray, had decided that private power companies should reap the benefits of the project and had sparked the small companies into banding together. As the AEC acting chairman, Sumner Pike, put it: ". . . we knew that the TVA could do it and would be able to do it . . . [But] in the meantime, Mr. Murray felt that perhaps we could get a group of private companies to come up with a better answer than a single one [the AGE] had done."

This was hardly a satisfactory explanation to some members of the House committee. Rep. Albert Gore (D, Tenn.) summed up their attitude when he told Chairman Pike, "If the privately-owned utility industry can supply the need for this plant at a rate and within an area beneficial to the government, and economically done, I would say 'Well and good,' but your relationship with the Congress . . . would have been greatly improved had you come to this committee before we learned from the newspapers that we are about to recommend or have already recommended . . . an appropriation which you are now in the position of saying you do not need. That is careless treatment of the taxpayers' money, as well as in dealing with the Congress."

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THE VOLUNTARY WAY

Early last week Price Administrator Michael V. DiSalle announced the government's new Pricing Standards, calling on business to hold prices voluntarily at their December 1 level. This was the first major action of the Economic Stabilization Agency and may prove to be the first mistake. The voluntary price formula came as the cost-of-living index soared to an all-time peak—10.2 points higher for the week ending December 12 than immediately before the start of the Korean War. Business felt the threat of new wage demands with prices frozen. Labor felt the threat of a wage freeze with cost of living uncontrolled. Representatives of both descended upon Washington to argue their cases.

The dilemma was emphasized when the General Motors Corporation responded to the order by suspending sales of three lines of 1951 passenger cars. GM's president, Charles E. Wilson, told the United Auto Workers that their coveted cost-of-living "escalator" wage agreements are in jeopardy as a result of Price Regulation Number One. GM had pioneered in the escalator contracts and felt particularly bitter about a roll-back in prices without wage control, despite the fact that GM's profits amounted to $702.6 million after taxes during the first nine months of this year. Both GM and Ford Motor Company, which had rescinded price increases, asked the ESA to agree to the same escalator feature for automobile prices as for auto wages. The International Harvester Company agreed to roll back its prices but asked for clarification of the new order. General Motors later complied with the government order; however most other industries delayed any revision of prices.

Even though the voluntary edict was intended as a stop-gap pending the drafting of individual price orders on industrial products and consumer goods, labor officials severely criticized the "honor system." Representatives of the CIO, the AFL, the International Association of Machinists and the Railway Labor Executives Association called on the President to declare that voluntary and selective industry control of prices does not meet the real problem facing workers today—that of skyrocketing food costs and rent increases. The Defense Production Act, which contains the authority for wage and price control, should be amended to include the power to fix rents and establish food prices at reasonable levels, the labor leaders said. Any wage freeze today would "inevitably lead to industrial unrest," the United Labor Policy Committee asserted. "So long as food prices and rents are thus subject to sharp and drastic increases, wage adjustments must be permitted."

An average family budget is spent in about the following manner: 40.6 percent for food, 12.4 percent for wearing apparel, 4.7 percent for household furnishing, 12.5 percent for rent, 5.1 percent for fuel, leaving 24.6 percent for all other items. Labor rightly feels that "the control of the prices of all the elements in the workingman's every day necessities is the central problem in wage stabilization." There is little doubt that the ESA will study labor's request seriously. The automobile, agricultural implement and aircraft industries, in which the United Auto Workers-CIO has more than a million members covered by its contracts, are all key industries in our nation's mobilization for defense.

The attitude of non-co-operation displayed by GM is indication enough that "voluntary" roll-backs are not the answer. The fact that prices soared after the outbreak of the Korean War, and even after passage of the Defense Production Act, despite strong government pleas that business voluntarily hold prices down, made the GM rebuff not too surprising. The Economic Stabilization Agency has plenty of evidence that a tougher price control policy could be enforced without bankrupting business. According to Department of Commerce statistics, net profits of all industries before taxes during the 1946-49 period averaged $28.8 billion. Net profits before taxes are expected to be more than $40 billion this year.

HERBLOCK IN THE WASHINGTON POST

"Gosh, if only we had more people on our side!"

KICKBACKS DON'T PAY

With J. Parnell Thomas recently paroled from federal prison, the Justice Department last week moved the indictment of another Republican Congressman accused of taking a heavy bite out of salaries paid to employees in his office. Rep. Walter Brehm, an isolationist Ohio Republican, is said to have received kickbacks totaling $1,380 from two of his women employees, and faces conviction under the Corrupt Practices Act with penalties running to 21 years in jail and $35,000 fines.

Under fire from columnist Drew Pearson since September, Brehm may have taken closer to $10,000 from two elderly women clerks over the past five years, but the statute of limitations exempts part of these from prosecution now. His prime victim was Mrs. Clara Soliday, whom he hired in 1945 and replaced with his own son when she

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broke her arm in 1948. In the intervening period he kept her real salary to less than $200 monthly, forcing her to "kick back" the rest of her $530 pay. Pearson revealed that when the FBI began to look into the case Brehm went to Mrs. Soliday's son to persuade him to say that the "kick-backs" had really been voluntary contributions to the Republican campaign committee in Brehm's Eleventh District. He refused.

Pearson, who got the goods on both Thomas and Brehm, has been airing two other cases involving members of Congress. Rep. Alvin O'Konski (R, Wis.) has been keeping "employees" on his staff who actually work on a newspaper in Wisconsin which O'Konski is buying. Rep. Victor Wickersham (D, Okla.) has been paying an "office assistant" who is selling farm machinery in Oklahoma.

Attorney General Howard McGrath has so far shown a noticeable reluctance to proceed vigorously in prosecuting his former colleagues on the "Hill." He recently asked for legislative strengthening of the applicable criminal sections, however, and with enough public pressure to urge him on may be persuaded to act.

SEGREGATION ABANDONED

AUSTIN, TEXAS (NR correspondent)

A council, composed of legislators, educators and businessmen, studying higher education in Texas, has just completed a remarkable recommendation which will be presented to the State Legislature when it convenes in January. The council proposes that "all efforts to extend separate education for Negroes at the graduate and professional level should be abandoned." Such a statement would have been unbelievable four years ago when Heman Marion Sweatt applied for entrance to the University of Texas law school.

The council recommended that present segregated graduate and professional training (in law and education only) be continued, with the recognition that it is being done only to make higher education more available to Negroes, and not in order to maintain segregation.

OUTSIDE AMERICA

The mood of Europe on the threshold of the new year has a certain resemblance to that of the condemned man who ate a hearty breakfast.

More Europeans are able this yearend to eat more and better than the last or the one before. Materially, in terms of the availability of the physical wherewithal of good cheer, the holiday season is probably the best since the end of the most recent of the world wars. Psychologically too, the Europeans are—or might be—better off, at least better than the Americans: they know that they have less reason to be cheerless this yearend than have the Americans. The situation in Korea has shifted the center of gravity of the Western world's immediate personal tragedies from Europe to America. Some Europeans are taking full advantage of these facts.

Indeed, the most important fact in Europe is that there is no longer any real impulse even to active flight. If there has been a change since Truman's statement on using the A-bomb, it has been from defeatism to passive despair. The plaything with neutralism has been replaced by a wholly serious feeling that the notion of armed resistance is for Europe little more than self-deceiving escapism.

It is significant that it was an Englishman who decided to go to Washington to plead Europe's case against the use of the atom bomb. It is scarcely less significant that as soon as Clement Attlee decided to go, he became automatically the spokesman for the hopeless and helpless European attitude toward the "fatality" explicit in the use of the bomb. An overwhelming majority of the Europeans in all the countries of the West are convinced that America's use of the bomb in China or Russia will lead to the physical destruction of Europe. But, as very many Europeans well know, physical destruction is only part of the problem. The question in men's minds is not only whether *a* Europe can conceivably survive physically, but *what kind* of Europe can survive.

Paul Reynaud, France's Premier in 1940, recently quoted Lenin to the French National Assembly: "The road from Moscow to Paris," Lenin said, "passes through Peking, Tokyo and Calcutta." If events in Asia open the road from Moscow to Paris, the Europe that survives, physically, will, most Frenchmen believe, be far more a travesty and deformation of the traditional free Europe of the rights of man than was the Nazi Europe. Still, France and Europe *did* survive, physically, both the Nazi occupation and the Nazi collaboration. And there are Frenchmen willing to believe that the condemnation which seems to lie ahead may not be to Europe's destruction and death, but to another enslaving but temporary occupation and collaboration — and maybe another chance to win back freedom.

The only French political party which came out quickly and vigorously in favor of trying, at any cost including atomic war, to keep the road from Moscow closed was Charles de Gaulle's. The general's political spokesman, Count Gaston Palewski, explained:

> If we want to defeat the totalitarian dictatorships, we must organize ourselves to struggle against them with the same weapons which they use. This also imposes a profound reshaping of the regimes which are maintaining themselves in a languishing Europe.

Thus, the alternative road to physical survival for Europe would lead not from Moscow but from Paris taking over the "tradition" of the Berlin of Hitler and the Rome of Mussolini. After the events in Korea during the final weeks of 1950, after the exhibition staged for the benefit of hesitant Europeans by "the great human masses of Asia," the number of Frenchmen willing to take their chances with neo-Fascism of the glory-and-grandeur Saint Cyr variety decreased rather sharply, however.

Thus, it is the very widespread feeling in Europe that 1951 may be America's year, or Russia's, but for Europe it can only mean an end of greatness that has been long in dying. PERCY WINNER

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POLITICAL PROGRAM FOR EUROPE

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE has led to two major decisions: to create an "integrated defense force" for Europe, and to rearm Germany. These military decisions may lead to further trouble unless they are followed quickly by a third political decision to unify Europe.

An "integrated armed force" is a contradiction in terms as long as it is made up of independent national contingents raised and maintained by independent national governments. It creates the illusion of strength, but not strength itself. Strength requires a European armed force; that requires in turn a political authority for Europe that can raise and maintain an armed force.

Moreover, a rearmed Germany is a clear threat to the West as long as its army is raised and maintained by an independent German government. The Germany of Adenauer and Schumacher is quite capable of leading the world into a general war in pursuit of its own nationalistic aims of reuniting Eastern and Western Germany. Only a European federation can forestall this appalling danger.

We allowed economic policy to run ahead of political policy in the years in which the Economic Co-operation Administration, under Paul Hoffman's imaginative leadership, was pressing Europe toward a unified economy. Now we are allowing military policy to outrun economic and political policy. The cause in both cases is timidity in the Department of State. The consequence must be frustration or failure.

The reluctance of the State Department to commit the United States dramatically and decisively to the goal of European union springs from unresolved confusions. They are expressed in the councils of government in arguments summarized below.

The first argument against continental union admits the weakness of the present national states but reasons that, if these states were to combine, they would only compound their own weaknesses. The fallacy of this argument is that it ignores the lessons of history including our own. Americans have only to look at any coin in their pockets to read "E Pluribus Unum" and to recall the circumstances in which that motto was adopted.

The second argument maintains that Europeans are still so afraid of Germany that they will never form a union that includes Germany unless Britain is also a full member. Since the British will not join, union is hopeless. In fact, however, the continental Europeans have already shown their willingness to join with the Germans in the Schuman Plan, of which Britain is not to be a member and in the proposed Pleven Plan organizations, in which the British are also not likely to join. These nations must unite in order to regain some measure of sovereignty. The United Kingdom in contrast is still an effective sovereignty, with a political radius and an economic base large enough to enable it to play an independent role in world affairs.

The third argument presents a set of false alternatives: *either* a union of the continental states *or* a union of all the members of the North Atlantic community including the United States and Canada. These alternatives are assumed to be mutually exclusive and, since Atlantic union is preferred, continental union is ruled out. As in all fallacies of this type, the answer is that the two possibilities are not true alternatives.

A more sophisticated version of this argument maintains that progress toward a continental union depends on simultaneous progress toward a North Atlantic union. There is a great deal of truth to the argument, but its proponents push it much too far. Their concept of a North Atlantic union is that of a federation of NATO members with considerable executive and legislative authority delegated to the central bodies. Since the United States, Canada and Britain are not prepared to give up so much sovereignty, it is argued that no progress can be made toward a continental union.

The fallacy here is essentially the same as that involved in the argument about Britain alone. A North Atlantic federation with the degree of organic unity needed in Europe is simply not needed to solve the specific problems confronting the United States, Canada and Britain or to enable the North Atlantic organization to undertake the tasks of regional defense.

Some internationalists argue that we cannot ask other nations to take steps which we are not prepared to take ourselves. This is the sheerest nonsense. The doctor who believes that only a serious operation can save his patient does not himself have to undergo a similar operation before he can offer his prescription.

The last and most important argument against a continental union may be called the fallacy of misplaced realism. It asserts that we forget about union in order to get on with the job of rearmament. But, if Europe's failure to rearm during the last two years proves anything, it proves that we must above all be realistic about the necessity of removing the underlying difficulties

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This is the last in a series of three editorial articles dealing with the crisis in Europe.

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which have hitherto prevented the Europeans from re-arming.

The bottleneck is in our underlying *political* lethargy abroad. So long as a "business as usual" attitude prevails in *political* attitudes and the inhibitions of normal diplomacy set self-imposed limits to the *political* leadership which the US is willing to offer—European union is not a realistic goal. If Western Europe is to be held for the free world then the US must demonstrate *political* courage and energy.

Toward what specific goals should American leadership be directed? The proposals advanced during the last six months by the French Government provide a good nucleus about which to build a set of objectives for the next few years.

For the Atlantic community as a whole the immediate aim might be to re-group the 12 NATO members into their three major and natural components: the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom and the Sterling Area, and the continental states. In place of the existing unwieldy 12-member committees, it would then be possible to establish boards consisting of one representative from each of the three component units. The gain in the efficiency of NATO's operations which would result from this simple change would certainly compensate for the fact that the central authority of the organization cannot be significantly increased. NATO would continue as in the past to provide a meeting place where its fully sovereign component units could co-ordinate their economic and defense policies, arrange for the allocation of scarce raw materials and other commodities in short supply, channel economic and military aid to one another, and concert their political and military strategy in the integrated defense force.

The continental component of this tripartite NATO framework will have to be a good deal closer to a true political and economic union. The central institutions envisaged by the Pleven Plan, if combined with existing or prospective agencies like the European Payments Union and those of the Schuman Plan, can form the nucleus of a European executive, legislature and judiciary. As they begin to grapple with the real problems facing the Continent, these agencies will inevitably have to broaden their functions.

The executive agency of the continental union will require a political apex, in a council of national prime ministers with a rotating chairman who also carries on the public functions as head of the union. While this council would decide basic domestic and foreign policy, the administration of the European executive would rest upon two departments—one for economic affairs and the other for defense.

The main jobs of the economic department would be to supervise and direct the individual national fiscal, monetary and commercial policies in order to ensure that the union as a whole maintained a reasonable trade and payments balance with the rest of the world and that all members followed consistent and harmonious national economic policies which permitted goods, money and people to circulate as freely as possible within the union. To these ends, it would have to develop the EPU into a central monetary authority analogous to our Federal Reserve Board, with full power to control national exchange rates either directly or through the extension of the EPU's present unit of account into a genuine common currency for the union. The economic department would of course prepare the union's budget, principally for defense expenditures, which might initially be financed by contributions levied on the individual national governments. This might be supplemented by making over to the union the revenue from tariffs on trade with the outside world, which would in any event have to be controlled by the central authority as part of its supervision of commercial policies.

In the OEEC secretariat and the national delegations to that body there already exists a group of trained and highly competent officials which could serve as the initial staff. The OEEC as such would be dissolved. The Schuman Plan's High Authority could form the nucleus of a section charged with supervision of trade practices and national investment programs.

In the defense field the union's powers would have to be more centralized. While the individual members may need to raise, equip and maintain some strictly national forces for service in overseas posts, the successful defense of Western Europe will require a truly integrated union army, air force and navy. At a minimum, the union's defense department would have to consist of a European general staff and a European defense minister. These in turn would be under the direction of the NATO Supreme Commander and NATO combined chiefs of staff in the same way as the American and British contingents made available for Western European defense.

In order to make such an arrangement really effective the union's defense department will have to have its own military budget, services of procurement and supply, and training centers and schools. While it might rely upon the member nations to furnish recruits and to determine the classes of individuals to fill the recruitment quotas, the defense department would need full power to control and assign forces at will and to determine their size, composition, standards and terms and conditions of service. Without all of these powers, it would be unable to create and maintain a truly European force.

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The roles of the European legislature and judiciary are much less clear. The legislature would consist essentially of the European Parliament envisaged in both the Schuman and Pleven Plans. This would undoubtedly be a body of representatives chosen by and from the existing national parliaments, and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe might be merged with it. At a minimum, the European Parliament should approve or modify the union budget, review reports to be submitted periodically on each of the major areas of the executive's activities and decisions in the economic and defense fields, and sanction international agreements and commitments entered into by the union. A system of European courts will also be needed to interpret the executive's decisions and to try claims and appeals arising from the executive's activities by both member states and individuals. An important and highly desirable function of the European judiciary might be the protection of basic civil rights and liberties where violations by national governments or the union's central authority are claimed by individuals.

At the outset, the European Parliament might not initiate legislation on its own or legislate at all in the true sense of the world. Rather it would serve to review, approve, modify or condemn the policies and programs of the central executive. In all probability the executive agencies, not the Parliament, will be the center of reconciliation, of negotiation and bargaining among national and group interests both because these central agencies will deal directly with existing national governments and because they will undoubtedly contain co-ordinating committees of representatives of the relevant national ministries. This would follow the new pattern that has already emerged in Western Europe since the war in the operation of the OEEC and the EPU.

In the non-military fields, therefore, the union's functions will essentially be to co-ordinate and to harmonize, the policies and activities of its member states. It need not have nor is it likely to have either the tax power or the police power, the two essentials of a national state; although through its superior ability to mobilize public opinion and its control of the standing defense forces it would be far stronger in these respects than the United States Government was under the Articles of Confederation. It would not necessarily need an elaborate and comprehensive Constitution which would carefully define its organization, powers and limitations and those of its member states. It could be more rapidly and effectively created merely by a series of agreements among the member nations to establish the functional agencies needed to discharge the specific duties outlined above.

Eighteenth century theories of constitution making and nineteenth century devices for ensuring popular control of the Executive are not really relevant to the problems of supra-national organization in Western Europe today. It is important to realize that, if and when a continental union emerges in Western Europe, it must and will be a new political and administrative form appropriate to the peculiar needs of this group of countries in the unprecedented conditions of the mid-twentieth century. Any attempt to follow slavishly the traditional notions of the separation of powers and of checks and balances, or of ministerial responsibility and cabinet government will seriously frustrate the successful development of the novel forms of supra-national co-ordination which have already begun to emerge in Europe.

Leadership is not a matter of providing a complete and definitive blueprint to the Europeans. What is required of the United States is a bold and dramatic declaration of the goals, a persuasive statement of the reasons why long-range solutions are necessary, and a resolute assurance that while American aid will be continuing it will no longer be given directly to national governments but only to the central authority of the continental union.

Our commitment to support a continental union must be whole-hearted. It must be sufficiently spirited to challenge the imagination and fire the enthusiasm of people sunken in apathy and cynicism. It must be sufficiently firm to move national governments unable to make drastic decisions of their own accord. It must be sufficiently constructive and generous to provide positive help in the painful job of devising new institutions and in the difficult task of sustaining them until their growing competence brings them the prestige and the economic strength necessary for independence. Lastly since Europeans alone can carry union through, any plan must be in terms they understand. The great majority of Europeans will welcome any initiative. The few intellectuals who react against all ideas sponsored by the US should realize that the threat is isolationism here, not interventionism. US rejection of Europe as a giant Korea will inevitably follow prolonged inaction. The supporters of Herbert Hoover, who is ready to abandon Europe to Russia, multiply throughout each wasted day.

The future of Western Europe, and with it the future of the whole free world, depends on the United States. We have accepted the leadership of military integration in Europe. But military responsibility without commensurate political action can be a torch whose fire consumes its bearer. In Europe as in Asia, the US lacks the manpower to accept full responsibility for defense, even if Europeans and Americans were ready to see the US play such a role. The only alternative to surrender is to create the conditions under which Europeans can save themselves.

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THE TRUMAN STATE OF MIND

by Richard L. Strout

HARRY S. TRUMAN is the most important man in the world today. Yet the press has been content to criticize recent incidents concerning him without analyzing what they may mean. During the last few weeks, there have been the ill-advised Truman press-conference comments on the use of the A-bomb in Korea, which brought Clement Attlee galloping to Washington, and two injudicious personal letters in which Mr. Truman angrily blew his top. Taken by themselves, the incidents are not very important. However, if they display a jittery President at a time of national jitters, they are very important indeed. It seems high time to re-examine the state of Harry Truman's mind.

Within the space of six weeks, five things befell Mr. Truman. Their cumulative effect might well have tried any man. They occurred against the ordinary back-breaking routine of being US President, an impossible executive job lumped by the Constitution on a single individual.

First was the attempt on his life. On November 1—the warmest November 1 in Washington history—occurred a scene as unreal and bizarre as the weather. Two Puerto Rican political terrorists started shooting in front of Blair House. When the aroused Truman looked out from the upper bedroom window, he saw the bloody bodies of police and would-be assassins dead or writhing on Pennsylvania Avenue, and heard cries below of "Get back; get back!" They had come to kill him—him, Harry Truman.

A week later Truman took a political licking. It was an election in which he had been confident of success. His Democratic Senate majority was cut from 12 to 2, his House majority from 91 to 35. Statistically the set-back was not too bad, about par for the mid-term election course. But the Senate Democratic leadership was decimated; "McCarthyism" rode triumphant, and a number of middle-road liberals and internationalists had been replaced by conservatives and crypto-isolationists.

That was number two. Next came military defeat in Korea, the most serious event in the chain and the more appalling and horrifying because it arrived just at the moment of supreme hope when the "home-by-Christmas" mood was universal. Mr. Truman had the goading additional knowledge that he was ultimately responsible as Commander-in-Chief and the sponsor of the very General MacArthur of whom—on all but military grounds—he had the gravest doubts. Now he and MacArthur were in the same boat.

Number four was a personal tragedy which the public can hardly appreciate. Charles Ross had been the idol and hero of Truman's Independence (Mo.) high-school days. Charles Ross had in him an element of nobility—his philosophic humor, talent and magnanimity had been revered by Harry Truman who was in the same class. When Truman named Ross as his press secretary, the two men joined in a White House prank, called up Miss Tilly Brown, their teacher, and felt their eyes moisten as the faltering voice of an old woman came to them faintly over the distance and from far-off days admonishing them to be "good boys" and work together. It may have been that Ross was the most important intimate Truman had with qualities that the President respected and needed. Burdened by overwork, Ross slumped in his chair after a press conference and never revived.

Then finally there has been the fifth incident touching Truman to the quick on another side. Harry Truman is a family man wrapped up in a close-knit trio. There is Bess, his wife, and Margaret, his only child. Harry Truman, the boy, wanted to be a great soldier, but West Point was denied. Then he fancied himself for a while as a great pianist; this too slipped away. All he got was the Presidency. But in Margaret's music and concert career he sublimated himself. It may be that he would be prouder of her success than his own as a politician. Mr. Attlee is a family man and understood why he was taken to hear the recital of Margaret Truman at Constitution Hall. The review by Paul Hume in the Washington *Post* next morning had the ring of an honest and competent critique. Hume spoke sympathetically of Margaret's attractive personality but declared, "Yet Miss Truman cannot sing very well." He offered technical points to support his thesis. Truman exploded with a vindictive letter written in long-hand, initialed "H.S.T."—a letter that threatened physical violence, that was forceful, harsh and vulgar. In a way it was funny. The situation of an irate father who happened only incidentally to be President, berating a music critic who had found fault with his daughter, struck a note that could not have occurred in the White House since Andrew Jackson. As in Jackson's day it was hard to know whether to laugh or be shocked. It was human, maybe, to see a loving father trying to defend his daughter, but it was bad business and bad politics.

Truman's letter to Hume was followed by an outburst

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to Representative Hebert (D, La.). Mr. Hebert is an old antagonist. But his proposal touched deep religious springs. Truman played into the enemies' hands by rejecting Hebert's plan for a national day of prayer with a sarcastic reference to the unholy atmosphere of the November election campaign. Hebert promptly made the letter public and professed himself "stunned."

All of Truman's letters do not follow this tone. I have seen those sent to at least two Washington correspondents who have respected his confidence, one a kindly letter of consolation and praise, another a whole series of notes dealing with one of Truman's favorite subjects, military history. Truman is an optimistic, jaunty, folksy person with an agreeable neighborly friendliness. He is no towering figure, but friends feel his limitations are matched by certain virtues, including loyalty, courage and determination.

But what do the letters mean? White House secretaries have said Truman got relief in scratching off these angry screeds and then tearing them up. Truman keeps farmers' hours and frequently reads his mail at 5:30 a.m. It might be better if he stayed a-bed mornings, for it is then that his letter-writing temptation seems to assert itself.

Truman's supporters are attempting to treat the whole matter facetiously, and perhaps that is the proper mood. Half apologetically, Truman recently told Chairman Justin Miller of the National Association of Broadcasters that he is under the handicap of "living the lives of two men—that of President and that of a human being." But the nation wants and deserves dignity in the White House if it cannot have greatness; it is the most potent rallying symbol of American national life and in time of desperate stress must not be carelessly treated.

I have watched Washington for a quarter-century and have never known a time when rumors were not afloat of some scandalous goings on or sinister ill of the White House occupant. These touched even such unexpected persons as Hoover and Coolidge. As for FDR, it was fairly widely believed that he was a confirmed toper, if not worse. Now these rumors are reviving.

The McCormick press quotes with editorial relish a newsletter commentator who declares: "With a foreboding that recalls FDR's last agonizing 12 months in office, word is spreading in well-informed circles in the Capital that the President's medical advisers are giving increasing attention to his state of health . . . Whatever the explanation may be, the symptoms are genuinely alarming. Congress, in particular, must be on the alert. President Wilson was not himself in the closing months of his presidency . . ."

The feeling of vindictive relish shining out of such rumors of the Commander-in-Chief's physical and mental incompetence at a time of national crisis is not merely irresponsible but ghoulish.

What then is Truman's mental state?

At the press conference in which he discussed the A-bomb, I thought he looked testy and belligerent. He interrupted questions to answer them before they were finished. He completely missed the point of the repeated A-bomb queries in reference to Korea, and his casual answers which were immediately rushed out in sensational bulletins by the press associations sent a shudder round the world. But this was carelessness, not loss of self-control. His attention was bent, of all things, on taking the press to task for criticisms of General MacArthur and in defending his Korean commander. You could see the familiar grin breaking through and the atmosphere clearing as President Truman got it all off his chest.

Just as the critic decides that conceivably these incidents mean something he sees Truman, a little later, sitting at the annual fathers-daughters dinner of the National Press Club, relaxed, happy and having the time of his life. It is impossible that such a pose was assumed. On Truman's right at the head table was a pudgy nine-year old with a big yellow bow in her hair, with whom he carried on a spirited, beaming conversation. The three-hour party ended in a romp: Truman and daughter Margaret signed every one of 200 menus presented them. He rose and told children and parents at the end he hadn't had such a good time for many a weary day and urged each child present to write to him personally in the Christmas mail.

Harry Truman has taken rash and reckless action in times past. The most notable that I remember was his decision to draft the railway strikers even after they had agreed to capitulate, an action that went through the House with a whoop and a roar and which failed in the Senate very largely because of the icy common sense of Senator Taft. Truman can be guilty of impulsive actions, but, on the other hand, he is about the last person whose nerve I would expect to crack. He has an obdurate, earthy quality which does not give way lightly.

I do not see any great change in Truman's mental state. He has recently gone through bitter trials, and to a limited degree they have shown an effect. Truman's gyrations of popularity have been as intense as those of any recent occupant of the White House. It would be hard to guess his position in 1952. But now his best friends prayerfully hope he will stop writing letters. They are uncouth in good times; they threaten to lower the prestige of one of America's greatest rallying symbols, the presidency, in a time of great danger. Truman probably has resolved a dozen times not to put hand to pen again. I hope he succeeds.

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INDO-CHINA—THE WEAKEST LINK

by Lawrence Finkelstein

INDO-CHINA is the key to Southeast Asia, the next striking point in the Communist campaign to drive Western influence off the mainland of Asia, and after Korea, the weakest sector in the front lines of the free world.

French authorities declare that the Vietminh rebels are training a force of 300,000 in Central Indo-China for an offensive intended to capture Hanoi and all of Tonkin province. They add that this force is equipped with heavy mortars, bazookas and other weapons superior to their own. They are unwilling, however, to treat the conflict as an international dispute or to take it to the UN before it is too late.

The military effort in Indo-China followed the bankruptcy of French political ideas; now it requires the presence of French troops. There are about 150,000 French soldiers from France, Morocco, Senegal and the many countries which have contributed to the Foreign Legion. The impossibility of holding Indo-China at present without them undermines the growth of a national independence movement. Nominal independence is given to Vietnam Laos and Cambodia. The French remain the dominant force. Control over foreign relations and military operations in time of war remain in French hands. The French still direct Vietnamese foreign commerce, a privilege which benefits French enterprise although it is only fair to add that Vietnamese entrepreneurs are few. In many unacknowledged ways the French maintain a tight hold on Indo-China. A traveller notices at once the preponderance of French officers in the local police force. French censors operate together with their Vietnamese counterparts in ensuring the discretion of the local press. The French language remains the medium of instruction in the secondary schools. French products predominate in the shops, largely because of French control of import licensing and foreign exchange. The French retain the right to be consulted before tax changes can be instituted which particularly affect the interests of French subjects.

Even on the assumption that Indo-China must be held against the forces of Ho Chi-minh, alliance with France is both an asset and a liability. It is an asset because there is no other force in the country capable of withstanding the military onslaught of the Vietminh, backed by substantial Chinese-Communist support. Yet the far-flung network of French forts and outposts has been only partly successful in maintaining order and has been conspicuously unsuccessful in wresting territory from the Vietminh. Large and important areas remain in Vietminh hands.

The French military record is not reassuring. Military implications of the alliance with France are still worse. Although there are honest and sincere Vietnamese who are both nationalist and anti-Communist and hence accept the French presence as a necessary means to the attainment of their national ends, as the lesser of the contemporary evils, there are far more Vietnamese for whom hatred of the French, resulting from the memory of past colonial indignities, is a more pressing emotion than fear of Communism. A great many of these people support the Vietminh. Eighty percent of the voluntary backers of the Vietminh movement are non-Communist nationalists who follow Ho Chi-minh because he offers national liberation from the French.

A Westerner can hardly appreciate the depth of feeling with which the French are detested in this country. Aside from the small, French-educated and relatively-privileged minority for whom French culture represents the consummation of all virtues, the Indo-Chinese peoples still react strongly to the psychological indignities and other abuses which their colonial status entails. For these reasons the French alliance is a political handicap both to the independent governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and to the United States which, through a process of association by now familiar to most Americans, is tarred with the same brush. American protestations of good will toward Indo-China and of concern for the assurance of democratic self-government will continue to be suspect so long as the United States has a declining colonial power as its principal ally. The Vietnamese people will not easily be dissuaded from the belief that it is through American support that the French have maintained their hold.

As for the "independent" governments of the three Indo-Chinese countries, Laos and Cambodia are weak, and offer Ho Chi-minh the opportunity for outflanking the French in Tonkin. There is increased warfare in Cambodia. In Laos, which borders on Thailand, an insurgent movement, backed by Vietminh, is gaining ground. Neither the governments of Cambodia and Laos, nor the government of Vietnam, which is the most important of the three in area, population and resources, have shown the capacity to attract decisive support from Ho Chi-minh.

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When the United States recognized Bao Dai, in February, 1950, it was with the hope that the Emperor would serve as a magnet for the non-Communist national groups who were either allied with Ho Chi-minh or who had not committed themselves. With a few exceptions, this hope has not been fulfilled. Open support for the Vietnam Government is not noticeably greater today than it was early in the year. Partly this disappointment has to be attributed to the French presence which leads to the widely held assumption that Bao Dai is a tool and a puppet of French colonialism. Bao seems to be a genuine Vietnamese nationalist; and he has succeeded in extracting more concessions from the French (notably the inclusion of the former colony of Cochin China within the area of Vietnam) than Ho Chi-minh was able to obtain during the abortive negotiations in 1946. But the Emperor has displayed no great interest in exercising the firm leadership which the present crisis demands. His recent return to the country after a long sojourn in Europe was partly the result of severe American criticism. His return was heralded as a portent of better things to come; but optimism on this score has been fairly widely dispelled by the recent announcement that the Emperor's projected trip to Hanoi to show himself to his subjects had been once more postponed because of royal illness.

The government of Vietnam, headed by Prime Minister Tran Van-huu, shows no more promise of exerting the political leadership required to attract away Ho's non-Communist support. And no one is able to point to any potential leaders who offer more than those who are now in power. It is a widely held view that, with the existing scarcity of political leadership, Tran Van-huu is the best possible choice for Prime Minister. But he commands scarcely any political following and has little popular appeal. Another possibility for national leadership, Ngo Dinh-diem, a widely known Catholic leader, has held no public office in recent years and is an unkown quantity. His notoriety derives from his success in resisting Bao Dai's appeals that he become Prime Minister, an achievement which has gained for him some popularity but which hardly provides assurance that he would be an improvement over the existing leadership. Even more striking objections are applied to other potential candidates for important national office.

Those who have not given up hope urge immediate steps toward full independence for Indo-China. Among the specific measures which are suggested are the creation of a Vietnamese national army, the transfer of more governmental powers, the grant of complete immediate independence or a precise commitment to relinquish remaining French prerogatives at a specified future date, and the transfer to the Vietnamese Government of the remaining symbols of French power, such as the High Commissioner's Palace, an ostentatious edifice on the Boulevard Norodom in Saigon, still occupied by High Commissioner Pignon.

Twelve Vietnamese battalions, partly armed under the United States Military Assistance Program, have been transferred to the Vietnamese Command, with their own officers. Tactically, they are subject to French control and for the purposes of the present campaign they will still serve as part of the French army. The French Government is now thoroughly committed to permitting the creation of a true Vietnamese national army and agreement implementing this basic commitment is expected daily. But the implementation of France's initial agreement has been a difficult process because of the fear in many French circles that a Vietnamese national army would be politically unreliable and might go over to the Vietminh or turn against the French in pursuit of complete national independence. In any case, arming and training a national army worthy of the name will be a long and tedious process which will require French technical participation for considerable time to come. The shortage of trained Vietnamese officers at the command level will mean that the new army will have to remain under French tactical control for the duration of the campaign against the Vietminh.

The transfer of greater governmental power encounters two major obstacles: French reluctance and Vietnamese incapacity. The French have misgivings about relinquishing the means by which they are able to protect their economic interests. And the Vietnamese display equal reluctance to assume new responsibilities which they may not be equipped to exercise. The French hesitate to commit themselves to final withdrawal from the country, so long as French blood is being spilled. Bao Dai appears to prefer the snarling tigers of Dalat to Ho Chi-minh's fighters.

The French are planning a greater transfer of real power and of the symbols of authority to the Vietnamese Government, in part, as the result of American pressure. But it seems unlikely that these measures will have substantial influence on political developments at this late date. Concessions by the French will inevitably be regarded as having been forced by events rather than as having been voluntarily given. Meanwhile, the past year has witnessed a substantial consolidation of Ho's power through the application of traditional police-state methods. Reports filtering through from Vietminh territories in the north indicate that a fairly thorough-going police control has been instituted which will at least inhibit a shift of allegiance to the Bao Dai camp. And it is at best uncertain how successfully the Vietnamese Government can wield real power. The best opinion

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in Saigon is that a political victory for Bao Dai is now out of the question. The contest is now essentially a military one, in which the winner will be the army that can bring the greatest effective force to bear.

It is widely believed, among military circles in Saigon, that, unless there is a radical change in the balance of forces, the French will be able to hold the Red River Delta and the important cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. This conclusion assumes that the French will want to hold these cities, in the face of an almost certainly extended campaign which will, at best, hinder communications and require a major French effort. It assumes also that the French will not commit tactical blunders such as those which led to the recent annihilation of sizable French contingents during the withdrawals from the border posts.

Ever these uncertainties pale beside any attempts at calculating the possibilities of decisive military victory. In part, the conflict will turn on the creation of a Vietnamese army capable of assuming garrison duties and of undertaking joint military operations against the Vietminh armies. It will turn further on the ability of the French to provide additional needed military manpower; and this will depend in part on the extent and nature of France's contribution to Western European defense under the provisions of the Atlantic Pact arrangement.

When the Monsoons start next year, and French planes are grounded, the Vietminh offensive is likely to roll across the Red River Delta. If the US stands by while France risks the loss of Indo-China, then our economic and strategic losses may be severe. If we had the forces to intervene, that also would be costly, and uncertain in its effect on Asia's tormented attitude toward Communism and Western intervention. The French National Assembly has once more declared that it reserves all decisions on Indo-China to itself, and will not refer the dispute to the UN unless overt Chinese aggression takes place. By then, of course, it will be much too late.

Yet there is no clear way in which other Western nations can by-pass France and bring the dispute to the UN. And it is not clear that treating the UN as a universal panacea and unloading all unsolved conflicts onto its overburdened councils will aid world peace. The Communist nations are certain to oppose all UN action. And Asian states which have not recognized Bao Dai have no formulas to offer in compromise. For the US, torn between the necessity of solidarity with France, and the necessity of opposing imperialism in Asia, there are no easy answers.

HAROLD L. ICKES: *McCarthy vs Pearson*

IN A RECENT column Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote of "a new sort of American underworld." They might have called it "a political underworld." The Alsops might even have been more precise and named some of the gangsters involved. Political gangsters can do more damage to their country and the civilized world than those who merely operate black markets or build gambling and vice into big business while bludgeoning and machine-gunning their way to the power that money can buy.

As a citizen of Chicago at the time, I had a ringside seat from which I could watch the power of Al Capone grow more ruthless and sinister every day. Now, from another ringside seat in Washington, I can see the emergence of underworld gangsters who would dominate our politics, even if they thereby distort and unbalance one of the most powerful and most democratic nations on earth. The gangsters who skulk in the political underworld cannot always be clearly distinguished, but one stands out so boldly that he cannot be mistaken as other than the Al Capone of this gang. This figure is none other than Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin.

There are similarities, as well as contrasts, between the Al Capone of Chicago and he of the political underworld of Washington. Both have been willing to chisel on their income taxes. It was for being caught at this by the federal government that Capone finally went to the penitentiary when it was not possible to convict him on any of his more lurid crimes. The state of Wisconsin has been doing what it could to collect unpaid income taxes from McCarthy. Both men have had incomes greatly in excess of their known returns, although, of course, McCarthy, as in other respects, has been a piker as compared with Capone. Both have taken advantage of every ambush from behind which to spring on their enemies and harass the public. Both men, probably to relieve nervous tension, have been devoted followers of the ponies.

But there has been one notable contrast between the Al Capone of Chicago and the political Al Capone of Washington. The man who disgraced Chicago for so many years disposed of his enemies by having them kidnapped or killed in cold blood. Capone, however, while killing ruthlessly, ran the risk of being killed. Senator McCarthy and his fellow gangsters of the political underworld of Washington are content to assas-

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sinate character which, in the estimation of persons more civilized and cultivated than the gross Senator from Wisconsin, is worse than physical torture or sudden death. In contrast with the real Capone, McCarthy as a character assassin operates in a way calculated to protect him from retaliation. He misrepresents and lies and smears from behind the protection of his Congressional immunity. He takes care not to expose himself to a lawsuit for libel. He may promise to do so. But these are just more of his lies—all the blacker because he deceitfully tells them to present the appearance of a courage that he totally lacks.

Despite his sedulous care, however, McCarthy may find that he has gone too far, even on the floor of the US Senate, in deliberately seeking to destroy the means of livelihood of a man who has criticized him, justly and on the basis of McCarthy's public record. If Drew Pearson should sue him, it might be held that Congressional immunity is not broad enough or thick enough to protect McCarthy in an action for damages for a deliberate and cold-blooded attempt to destroy Pearson's business.

Capone was after money—money and political power. McCarthy, too, is after money, as witness the $10,000 fee paid by the Lustron Corporation for a report on housing purported to have been written by McCarthy but, in fact, written by a federal employee in the Housing Administration on time paid for by the government. McCarthy's value as the supposed author was due to the fact that, as a member of a subcommittee, he had traveled hither and yon at government expense to investigate housing. McCarthy, too, is a glutton for political power and ruthless about going after it, although he is careful not to indulge in libel if he has inadvertently left his cloak of Congressional immunity hanging in his closet.

It may be that Capone, against his background and slum upbringing, might have started an unseemly brawl at a dinner-dance to which a gracious, even if ill-advised, hostess had invited him. However, so far as is known, Capone was not a social hoodlum. However, McCarthy, first verbally and then with fist and knee, committed assault and battery upon Drew Pearson at a social affair, thus proving that, socially, he is utterly illiterate.

The significance of the McCarthy assault does not lie in the fact that he attempted to vent his spleen upon a man who, well within his rights and pursuant to his duty, had publicly criticized him for what he regarded as public misconduct. From the public's point of view, the real significance of this unsavory episode precipitated by McCarthy was to serve notice that, so far as he was concerned, a publicist may not criticize a public man except at the risk of losing his means of livelihood. In short, the emanations imposed by McCarthy upon the US Senate in his speech smearing Drew Pearson were designed to narrow sharply the scope within which a commentator or columnist is able to operate. The real danger inherent in the McCarthy attack was that it showed his intent to muzzle, or at least to punish, a man who has performed more than one outstanding public service. What this writer cannot understand is why newspapers, magazines, commentators and columnists generally do not recognize in McCarthy's verbal assault from the floor of the Senate upon Drew Pearson's livelihood a deliberate effort to silence a man who has been outspoken in his criticism of McCarthy. They should reflect that if McCarthy can muzzle Pearson by destroying his means of livelihood, he, either with or without help from his fellow-gangsters in the political underworld, can muzzle other critics or at least water down their criticism to a dangerous degree.

No one need care if a political mountebank who is not yet "house-broke" should call a fellow guest at a social function a liar or assault him with fist and knee. The people have already formed their opinion of McCarthy and taken soundings of his shopworn veracity. But they should not regard as merely another grotesque antic his deliberate attempt, from the floor of the Senate, to destroy the means of livelihood of a man who makes his living by pen or over the air as a commentator on public affairs and the conduct of public officials. We need comments about public affairs in these troubled times, and there should be more, rather than less, criticism of public officials, provided of course that it is sincere and well informed. We need forthrightness and not cowardice. Especially should we beware of headline hunters with no regard for the reputation and well-being of others. We need more men like Drew Pearson—who has nothing to hide behind if he commits libel or otherwise overreaches himself in his comments. We need fewer McCarthys who strike with poisonous fangs from behind an abused Congressional immunity which, I am sure, the writers of the Constitution never intended, to protect a man who has demonstrated that he can hit below the belt, both in a physical encounter and on the floor of the Senate.

The august US Senate has been able proudly to show the world, in retaining McCarthy, what a strong stomach it has. The Senate may gag at him and reach for a bottle of medicine, but it will not belch him forth as it should to maintain its own dignity and prestige. Our free press will not much longer be free if the livelihood of those who write for it may be put in jeopardy by a McCarthy who, if successful so far as Drew Pearson is concerned, will incite fellow political gangsters to a similar course of reckless vengeance.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE WRITER IN THE TOTAL STATE

by Ernest J. Simmons

IT IS A commonplace for Russian Marxian critics to identify their country's literature with politics, which may be one reason why Soviet literature has been so little appreciated in America. In its first period of development, however, from 1917 to 1928, Soviet literature was less inhibited by politics. The new regime was fighting for its life, and the Communist Party, preoccupied with more urgent matters and uncertain about dictating ideologies, did not interfere a great deal in literary production. As a result, literature and particularly criticism enjoyed something of a renaissance under the liberating stimulus of revolution. A myriad of competing literary groups, representing everything from art for art's sake to hard-bitten proletarian orthodoxy, vied with one another for public and official approval. But much of this gay freedom came to an end with the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-32), the period Miss Borland has selected for special study. This is the first such specialized investigation of the period in English; it is an interesting contribution to our understanding of Soviet literary politics and controls.

SOVIET LITERARY THEORY AND PRACTICE DURING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1928-32), by Harriet Borland (King's Crown Press, Columbia University; $3.50).

To a degree perhaps not generally recognized, the success of the First Five-Year Plan was connected with Stalin's bid for final control of the Party and country. Hence in this "second revolution," with its drive toward socialism through industrialization and agricultural collectivization, all human endeavors were harnessed to Five-Year Plan tempos, and these included the arts and literature. The comparative literary freedom of the NEP days vanished overnight; writers and their products quickly came under the control of an extremist organization, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP).

Miss Borland traces the complex history of RAPP and its devious practices and methods of control. The triumph of RAPP was really the culmination of prolonged and hitherto unsuccessful efforts, dating from the early years of the revolution, by a group of left-wing writers to obtain proletarian hegemony in Soviet literature. They had opposed themselves to the fellow travelers and all other literary groups, both Marxian and non-Marxian, which did not subscribe fully to proletarian demands and the "social command" of RAPP.

The relations of RAPP to the political fractioning of the time and to the Communist Party itself are aspects of the subject to which Miss Borland gives too little importance. In contrast to its position today, the Party hesitated to endorse any literary group. It was in fact on public record, in a decree of the Central Committee of 1925, as being opposed to extending unqualified Party support to any such body. However, there is now sufficient evidence to indicate clearly that the Party gave full backing to RAPP, at least in 1929-31; for without it RAPP would hardly have dared to crack the whip so brutally over writers both inside and outside its camp. Before long RAPP had control of most magazines and publishing houses and was strong enough to make or break any author save the thoroughly established ones (Gorky, for example).

Because of the later condemnation of RAPP, there is a disposition in official accounts, such as the one in the Soviet Literary Encyclopedia, to damn everything and everyone connected with the organization. And Miss Borland tends to place too much emphasis on such accounts in her appraisal of the literary and critical program of RAPP. As she points out, there was a left wing and a right wing to RAPP, and in the later attacks on the organization the more extreme program of the left wing was often, and perhaps purposely, confused with that of the right. Though the final responsibility for the failure of RAPP belongs to the right-wing leadership, consisting of Averbakh, Libedinski and Fadeyev, it did offer, within certain limits, an enlightened program of creative art, which stressed the idea of the "living man," the need for psychological penetration of character, and the importance of learning from the great models of the past, especially Tolstoy. This program even embraced certain features of the brilliant literary theory of the arch-enemy of RAPP, A. K. Voronski, who believed that creative art was necessarily individual, and that its principal task was not to understand the world in the interest of a class, but to "remove the veils" and discover it. Finally, the right wing of RAPP did not hesitate to praise the works of enemy fellow travelers if they revealed the qualities demanded by its program.

Miss Borland discusses with much insight a number of the more important novels, plays and poems produced in answer to the social demands of the Five-Year Plan. A few of them were works of some distinctions: Sholokhov's *Soil Upturned*, Leonov's *Sot* and *Skutarevsky*, Katayev's *Time Forward!*, etc. However, she recognizes that these are glittering needles in the enormous literary haystack of Five-Year Plan propaganda rubbish.

The reasons for the demise of RAPP, decreed by the Central Committee in 1932, are carefully explored in a comprehensive analysis of the report of the First Plenum of the Organizing Committee of the Union of Soviet Writers. The fundamental reason was that the Five-Year Plan was over and hence

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RAPP, its literary instrument, was no longer necessary. Apart from the catastrophic results of its reign in literature, however, the fatal error of RAPP, as Miss Borland points out, was the political one of "attempting to substitute itself for the leadership of the Party in the literary field, of creating an organization outside of the government apparatus. . . ." Today the Party no longer feels that it must direct the fortunes of literature from behind the scenes. With the decrees of the Central Committee of August, 1946, it publicly declared its intention of dominating Soviet literature in all its aspects, and it has been doing so ever since. Apparently the Party is not afraid of repeating the disastrous experience which it condemned in 1932. Nor will it learn the lesson expressed by a character in Leonov's *Skutarevsky*: "One can only serve one master . . . either art or . . . social reforms," or the wisdom of Lenin: "All aspects of literature are good except the boring."

The documentation, notes and bibliography of this book are extensive and thorough, and Miss Borland must be credited with contributing a highly important pioneer study in a field which has been little investigated in America.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS IN 1950

THE STORY OF MY PSYCHOANALYSIS, by John Knight (McGraw-Hill; $2.95).

IT IS RARE that a psychoanalytic book for the general public completely fulfills its projected purpose. *The Story of My Psychoanalysis*, written by a layman who hides his identity under the pseudonym of John Knight, is such a book. It accurately describes the essence of the analytic process, and does so without resort to mysticism or jargon. The language is simple and clear and will be understood by everyone. The author deserves a special tribute; he succeeds where so many professionals have failed.

Three concurrent themes run through the book. First, Mr. Knight traces the genetic development and therapeutic resolution of his neurotic conflict. Simultaneously, he takes up, one by one, the basic psychoanalytic concepts and defines them against the backdrop of his own personal experience. Free association, the unconscious, transference, dreams, the mechanisms of defense—all become doubly meaningful to the reader because they are illustrated *in vivo*. Finally, he dispels two common misconceptions about psychoanalysis: the exaggerated significance of sex and the illusion of the magical cure. It is especially here that he performs a much needed service.

The average layman is convinced that psychoanalysis blames everything on sex. This belief stems from Freud's earliest formulations in which the prime mover in all behavior, both neurotic and normal, was the sexual instinct. Sex had an autonomy of its own and was cut loose from social realities. Today, however, analysts are generally agreed that sexual behavior does not exist in a vacuum. It is intimately related to the social environment and can be understood only as an integrated part of the total personality. This was the orientation in Mr. Knight's analysis: "Dr. Maxwell made it clear that sexuality was not in a special class by itself, set off from dependence, aggression, competitiveness, father-hatred, and the other important problems that I was learning to recognize and work through." The public does not always give credit where credit is due. Psychoanalysis in 1950 is not psychoanalysis in 1900.

It will be much harder to wean the public from the second misconception. The wish for magical aid has biological roots in the helplessness of the infant at birth, and the adult falls back upon it in times of stress. The search for panaceas is a universal phenomenon, much more common than efforts at realistic solution. This is so true of the person who has a neurotic conflict that it is almost axiomatic that every patient enters analysis with a hidden illusion of a magical cure. Mr. Knight's story confirms that there is no such thing. He got well, but only through learning to do for himself.

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AMERICA ON THE EVE

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1949, by Richard P. Stebbins (Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations; $5).

"IF WE COULD first see where we are and whither we are tending," declared Lincoln during an earlier Cold War, "we could better judge what to do and how to do it." All current contributions toward such insight are welcome. For literate citizens who take their responsibilities seriously, one solidly factual work in the field of foreign policy is worth a score of books devoted to gossip or exhortation. The annual surveys prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations are works of solid fact. This latest volume is one of the best of the series, replete with documentation, statistics, maps, bibliography, chronologies and a usable index.

Thanks to the skill of Mr. Stebbins and his collaborators, the massive data here assembled are not only accurate and surprisingly complete (given the limits of available time, space and sources) but are well ordered, readable, and conducive to thought—which, conceivably, may be more useful than fear, hate and hysteria even in a time of aggression, bloodshed and sacred crusades.

The major themes of the work are (1) economic recovery and efforts at common defense in Western Europe, comprising, together with events in Greece, Yugoslavia and Germany, an American "victory" over Moscow; and (2) Communist triumph in China as an American "defeat" of the first magnitude. Careful attention is given, albeit briefly, to Congress, the UN, ERP, the Middle East, Japan, Latin America and the British Commonwealth.

Amid the perplexities facing an ill-co-ordinated Leviathan, battling with the Red Behemoth and grappling with the often imponderable responsibilities of global hegemony, what common denominators of national problems and purposes are visible? In his Introduction, George F. Kennan suggests some: opposition to a power whose program "if successful would mean the destruction of civilized life"; the "unavaila-

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bility" of Germany and Japan "to play their full part in the balance of forces"; and the need of great maturity, sagacity, restraint, vigilant strength and loyal allies. At the very end, Mr. Stebbins warns against "recoiling from difficulties and sacrifices," but reminds us that American power is "not merely a matter of machines and weapons, but also one of ideas and emotions. Only so long as the United States was identified with generous championship of human liberty and progress, both at home and abroad, could it compete effectively for the allegiance of mankind. . . ."

Yet the more crucial dilemmas posed to America by Muscovite strategy are here barely touched upon. Anti-Communism (like its Soviet counterpart, anti-Americanism) is less a policy than a form of paranoia. When translated into far-flung and unlimited commitments, incapable of being balanced by any imaginable mobilization of American power, its most probable result, if past experience is any guide, will either be global war or a national nervous breakdown. Either eventuality threatens to efface many of the distinctions between democracy and totalitarianism. Peace-through-Strength is easily transmuted into War-for-Peace. Long before the late George Orwell forecast its advent, 1984 may be upon us.

How these hazards can be avoided no one appears to know. All current answers sound hollow, perhaps because all of us realize, despite our words, that a super-colossal arms race ordinarily has but one possible termination and that Super-Powers cannot actually frighten one another into pacific behavior. Freedom and fear go ill together. But fear and Fascism are kin. What the Russians may scare us into is for us—and should be for them—more disturbing than what we may scare them out of.

As long as we have not passed beyond the point of no return, however, the application of knowledge, reason and good will to our problems, admirably exemplified in such analyses as this volume attempts, may yet save the future.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

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PASTEL TRAGEDY

THE WORLD MY WILDERNESS, by Rose Macaulay (Little, Brown; $3).

THERE is an odd form of escapism that appears in much of current English fiction. Yearning backward glances to the orderly times before the recent war are to be expected, but this escape seems to be rather into style, into the elegant poised attitudes and phrases which are the evocative music of the golden days. England's novelists do not refuse to see or understand postwar developments; they can look with compassion and insight on the new while still deploring the passing of the old. But in writing of the devastating results of the war, the style remains so delicate, so balanced, so full of light little ironies and graceful turns of humor, that the bitter matter which might lie at the base of a novel is obscured by the glitter of its manner. Thus both writer and reader are sheltered from direct contact with baleful meanings.

For instance, Rose Macaulay's *The World My Wilderness* concerns seventeen-year-old Barbary Deniston and her French step-brother Raoul, who had spent their childhood working with the Maquis in Southern France. After the war they are sent to England to be educated and, if possible, civilized, but the youngsters cannot live simply and openly. They cling to the habits of subterfuge, lying and stealing and treating any figure of authority (no matter how benevolent) as if he were a member of the Gestapo. Since the normality of a well-ordered household is insupportable to them, they find their natural habitat in the ruins around St. Paul's, re-creating wherever possible their life in the Maquis.

The amorality and the wildness of the two children and the gang of young thieves they work for symbolize fairly obviously the decay of morality in Europe—part of the war's destruction that is still going on. Also affected in their different ways by that destruction are Barbary's conservative British father who cannot understand the secret winds that blow through her, an older brother whom the chaotic war years have driven to the quiet of traditionalism, and the mother, Helene, a symbol of the intelligent, headstrong individualist who cannot keep clear (though she would like to) of the mess in which everyone is mired.

The World My Wilderness is a novel of many great charms. It contains some magnificent pages describing London past and present. The secondary characters spring quickly into human dimensions and there is wit and beauty in the writing. But there is also a strange incongruity stemming from the large, tragic import of the story and the pastel quality of its telling, as if a harpsichord were used to convey the sounds of bombing.

KATE SIMON

Also of Interest

The editors offer these notes to describe briefly current books about which their readers should be informed.

East of Home, by Santha Rama Rau. Harper; $3.

A fresh and existing account of a hitchhiking trip taken by a Western-educated Indian girl through China, Indo-China, Siam and Indonesia. Miss Rama Rau's curiosity, perceptivity and human sympathy give the reader more insight into the peoples of the East and their problems than many a weightier tome.

The Theory and Practice of Hell, by Eugene Kogon. Farrar, Straus; $3.75.

This Baedeker to Buchenwald (and other camps) is a complete record and as unsensational as the subject permits. The author, a Bavarian Catholic journalist, was himself an inmate.

United States Civil Defense. US Government Printing Office; 25 cents.

In his capacity as chairman of the National Security Resources Board, W. Stuart Symington has submitted this plan for civil-defense preparation and mobilization to the President. The citizen can learn from it what steps are proposed to help him save himself if the day comes.

U.S. Camera Annual 1951. Edited by Tom Mahoney. Duell, Sloan and Pearce; $6.50.

As usual, a rich collection of news, fashion, anecdotal, experimental and art photography. Not all the plates are successful, but few are uninteresting, and the astonishing versatility of lens and film is once more proved to the hilt. Special sections this year offer a portfolio of Korean combat reports, the uses of photography in science and an album of Brady portraits. There is a brief section in color.

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MUSIC: Joseph Szigeti

ENFORCEMENT of the McCarran Act reached its nadir when Joseph Szigeti was shunted from the dock to Ellis Island and detained there for five days. The Hungarian-born violinist was returning from a European tour to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his American debut with a Carnegie Hall concert on December 19, and suffered the ill luck to arrive on a Thursday. The mills of Ellis Island grind slowly at best; over the weekend they do not grind at all.

Szigeti passed his days of attrition in the pleasant companionship of his friend and countryman, Erwin Doroghi, a professor of political science and former adviser to the American embassy in Budapest, who was deprived of Hungarian citizenship for anti-Communist activities. On Monday afternoon both were released after brief routine questioning. I do not know Professor Doroghi, but I do know Szigeti well, and I can only say that I wish more native Americans possessed so keen a sense of world citizenship and so quietly idealistic a concern for human welfare. Ironically enough, Szigeti would have been an American citizen long ago if his examination in Los Angeles had not been repeatedly scheduled at times when he was on tour.

Now fifty-eight, Szigeti has been a musician of international reputation ever since he made his professional debut at fifteen, with the blessing of the great violinist Joseph Joachim. For ten years he appeared in all the major cities of Europe. At twenty-five, he settled down for a seven-year academic career as professor at the conservatory in Geneva. In 1925, Leopold Stokowski persuaded him to give up teaching to come to the United States, where he made his debut with the Philadelphia Orchestra, playing the Beethoven Concerto. Even then nobody performed it with greater power or deeper understanding, and he quickly grew to be an indispensable figure in the concert life of America. In 1941 he bought a home in Southern California and began the still uncompleted process of becoming an American citizen.

For his anniversary concert in Carnegie Hall Szigeti engaged the admirable Dimitri Mitropoulos and a body of players from the Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra. He played Corelli's "La Folia," an early Bartók work called "Portrait" No. 1, and both the Brahms and Beethoven concertos. The Beethoven, performed with exceptional breadth and nobility, was the climax of a magisterial evening.

Szigeti effectively refutes the notion that it is impossible to get an education without attending college or signing up for the Great Books course. His formal schooling ended when he went on the concert stage at fifteen. But he has valued knowledge and understanding the more because it was not offered to him in packaged form. His mind works with singular clarity: he is that rare phenomenon, a first-class musician able to discuss the problems of his art.

His playing does not have the silken sheen of Heifetz's. He does not produce Elman's luscious, emotionalized tone; he does not have Francescatti's champagne-like volatility. But his playing is vitally communicative. He is the most serious of violinists, always deeply conscious of his responsibility to the composers for whom he is a spokesman and frequently implying even after his finest performances discontent that he did not play better.

In 1906, the year before Szigeti's professional debut, Ferruccio Busoni, one of the greatest musical figures of the day, sent the boy a note of advice after hearing him play privately: "My wish is: may your art satisfy you—others will then rejoice in it; but the former is the more important." Szigeti has spent his career trying to satisfy himself, and it has been our privilege to rejoice in it.

The basic challenge to the musical interpreter, Szigeti feels, is provided by the "standard works that accompany us from the cradle to the grave." There can be no lapse of devotion, no letdown of energy toward music that is "insurmountable"—the solo-violin works of Bach, the Beethoven and Brahms concertos and, in their different ways, such modern compositions as the Alban Berg concerto and Stravinsky's Duo Concertant. Interpretation is a transcendental effort, a "storming of the unattainable," in which the player seeks not to reproduce but to re-create the music the composer wrote. Great works are inexhaustible; only poor works offer no challenge, for in them nothing remains in doubt.

Official orthodoxy has no place in Szigeti's conception of the function of the re-creative musician. He sees the existence of every piece of music as a continuous, living process, moving through a series of stages—the composer's original conception, his first draft, his completed composition, the engraver's proof (in which the composer often changes his ideas), the published work, and its performance. The performer shares with the composer the task of bringing to fruition the conception that set the whole creative process in motion. The edicts of musicologists and the dictates of tradition, helpful though they may sometimes be, are not binding. Imagination, intuition, even fresh creation are the necessary qualities of the interpreter. It is better to communicate the meaning of a Bach sonata than to bow it with the mechanical correctness a Bach scholar prescribes. The final arbiter in any performance is the taste of the player, which consists in a sense of tact that keeps him from going astray and a gift for achieving style by unifying heterogeneous elements.

Szigeti's musical interests are broad. His concern for Stravinsky and Bartók is no less than for Bach and Beethoven. But his programs contain no Sarasate or Wieniawski, included merely to show how well or how rapidly he can handle the fiddle. For Szigeti thinks of himself not as a violinist but as a musician who plays the violin. He is one of the chief ornaments of our musical life, and it is a pleasure to salute him on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his first American appearance.

CECIL SMITH

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MOVIES

Continental Trio

IN THE DEVELOPMENT of the movies there has been almost no equivalent to the short story or the one-act play. The picture houses offer "specialties," cartoons, newsreels, but the advertised feature runs, with the rarest exception, from 90 to 120 minutes. It is unlikely, therefore, that we should ever have seen Jean Renoir's "A Day in the Country," Marcel Pagnol's "Jofroi" or Roberto Rossellini's "The Miracle" if it had not happily occurred to Joseph Burstyn that each of these half-hour pictures exemplifies a definition of love and that they could be bracketed under the title "Ways of Love."

In a sense, the most striking thing about the Renoir and Pagnol films (Rossellini's production is a special case) is the feeling of bulk that each gives. We are so accustomed to padded movies that though neither picture is very weighty, it seems to have at least as much content as, say, "Mr. 880" or "Jackpot" or any standard product based on what is really a short-story theme.

Actually, neither "A Day in the Country" nor "Jofroi" is particularly memorable. The former, based on a bittersweet Maupassant story of *amour manqué*, is set in a key of misty impressionism which, if the principal actors were more evocative, emotionally more pressing, could have been tremendously effective in the present strident atmosphere of the screen. As it is, the picture is tentative, a little inconsequential, inclined to prettiness. It possesses a style, consistent, elegant and based on a convinced view of reality; if it had a bit more force it would be an important work.

Pagnol took his "Jofroi" from Giono, the French "poet of the soil" who has provided him with so much of his material. It tells, in a mood of pathetic-comedy, of an old farmer who sells his orchard and then defends with his life the senile trees that the new owner would clear from the land. As usual, Pagnol leans heavily on extravagant types, lingers over mannerisms and creates his action by the elaboration of a kind of lunatic reasonableness. The picture is funny in spots, it is gently touching throughout; but Pagnol, I think, mistrusts the quality of his anecdote, and is in the position of a raconteur who laughs uproariously at his own joke in an effort to infect his audience.

Rossellini's "The Miracle" is the kind of work from which a critic tries to escape by falling into the first person. Whether he likes it or not depends almost entirely on his tolerance for emotion-shredding in close-up. It looked to me as though the director had let Anna Magnani out of a cage and jumped briskly out of range of her passions. Her subsequent dramatic monologue (of a mad and pregnant shepherdess who thinks the stranger she lay with in the hills was St. Joseph) is undeniably impressive; it is also, to me, inescapably embarrassing. Magnani is a virtuoso whose emotional range, physical vigor and overwhelming personality are unmatched on the screen today; I would not say that she is a notably disciplined artist or one with a sure feeling for the slippery edge where communicable passion plunges off into repellent histrionics.

Over Christmas, "The Miracle" was banned in New York by Commissioner of Licenses, E. T. McCaffrey. The Commissioner stated that he found the picture "officially and personally blasphemous," by which he apparently meant that he was acting on his own initiative.

The action is being fought and by next week we should know whether or not McCaffrey can get away with his high-handed action. It would be helpful, meanwhile, if he would clarify his objection. To blaspheme is to revile or curse the Deity and "The Miracle," whatever its shortcomings, is a powerful statement of the mercy and peace that God bestows on his most unhappy and forsaken children. If the Commissioner is setting himself up as a one-man inquisition he should consult a dictionary before handing down any more bulls.

ROBERT HATCH

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by DOROTHY MATHENY

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